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The aim of this study is to evaluate the financial performance of European socially
responsible investment (SRI) funds for the period 1993–2012 to contrast whether there
is a relationship between the application of social screening on investment decisions
and funds’ financial performance measured by Carhart’s alpha. Regression analysis has
been used to test the hypotheses of this research with a sample free of survivorship bias
of 184 SRI equity funds from 14 European countries and the population of conven-
tional funds from the same country and investment objective. The main conclusion of
this study is that the application of social criteria in investment decisions carries a cost
to the investor in terms of lower financial performance caused by differences in
screening intensity.
Keywords: SRI; ethical fund; social screening; social responsibility; performance;
portfolio theory
El objetivo de este trabajo es evaluar la eficiencia financiera de los fondos socialmente
responsables europeos durante el periodo 1993–2012 a fin de contrastar si existe una
relación entre la aplicación del cribado social en las decisiones de inversión y la
eficiencia financiera del fondo medida con el alfa de Carhart. El análisis de regresión
ha sido empleado para contrastar las hipótesis de esta investigación con una muestra
libre de sesgo de supervivencia de 184 fondos sociales de renta variable de 14 países
europeos y la población de fondos convencionales del mismo país y objetivo de
inversión. La principal conclusión de este estudio es que la aplicación de criterios
sociales en las decisiones de inversión conlleva un coste para el inversor en términos de
una menor eficiencia financiera causada por diferencias en la intensidad del cribado
social.
Palabras clave: ISR; fondo ético; cribado social; responsabilidad social; eficiencia;
teoría de cartera
1. Introduction
Numerous empirical studies have been published in recent years testing whether financial
performance of the so-called socially responsible investment (SRI) funds is significantly
better or worse than that of conventional funds. The main aim of all these studies is to test
whether the use of ethical or social criteria in investment decisions really involves the
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acceptance on the part of the investor of a lower return, which will demonstrate a change
in the economic rationale of agents.
The discussion of whether levels of return are lower or risk higher for SRI funds is
usually supported by two different theories:
– According to the modern portfolio theory, reducing the range of possible invest-
ments by including ethical or social considerations in the investment policy of the
portfolio, what is called social screening, increases total portfolio risk, transaction
costs and management fees reducing funds’ performance (Hickman, Teets, & Kohls,
1999; Rudd, 1981; Tippet, 2001).
– For the classical theory of the firm, the firm’s need to supply information to SRI
funds and to adapt its management to the social requirements of these funds
involves some costs (agency and opportunity costs) that have no economic aim
and so there must be an adverse effect on the profitability of the firm (Belkaoui &
Karpik, 1989). Thus, the lower profitability of socially responsible firms will affect
negatively the returns of SRI funds.
On the other hand, the reasons given by the social theory to explain how SRI funds might
achieve financial performance as good as or better than that of conventional funds, despite
constraining their range of possible investments by applying ethical or social considera-
tions in addition to purely economic ones, are the following:
– Firms acting in accordance with certain ethical criteria are more efficient and better
managed, leading to their outperformance in the market (Goldreyer & Diltz, 1999;
Guerard, 1997; Hamilton, Jo, & Statman, 1993; Tippet, 2001).
– SRI fund managers need more knowledge about the firms they invest in than do
those of conventional funds and so base their decisions on more detailed, fuller and
higher quality information, thus reducing the risk of their decisions (Goldreyer &
Diltz, 1999; Kurtz, 1997).
– SRI funds invest in smaller firms, which adapt more easily to changing market
conditions (Gregory, Matatko, & Luther, 1997; Luther, Matatko, & Corner, 1992).
The empirical evidence obtained in studies carried out to date has failed to support any of
the arguments or theories described above (Bauer, Koedijk, & Otten, 2005; Fernandez-
Izquierdo & Matallin-Saez, 2008; Fernández Sánchez & Luna Sotorrío, 2006; Goldreyer
& Diltz, 1999; Gregory et al., 1997; Gregory & Whittaker, 2007; Hamilton et al., 1993;
Kreander, Gray, Power, & Sinclair, 2005; Mallin, Saadouni, & Briston, 1995; Matallín
Sáez & Fernández Izquierdo, 2002; Scholtens, 2005; Statman, 2000) so that researches
must ask themselves why the obtained results are not in agreement with the theoretical
propositions. Consequently, more research is necessary to explain why relationship
between the application of social criteria on investment decisions and financial perfor-
mance is not found.
Thus, the aim of this study is to evaluate the financial performance of European equity
funds to contrast whether there is a significant difference in performance between social
and conventional funds analysing, specially, the effect of social screening on funds’
performance. In response to this objective, the following null hypothesis is put forward:
H1: The financial performance of SRI and conventional funds is the same.
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The absence of conclusive results in former studies may be due to there being
important differences among the SRI funds themselves. One of these differences is the
investment policy applied by SRI fund managers (ethical or social criteria used to select
the assets making up funds’ portfolio), which may affect the financial performance of
these funds. For SRI funds that apply exclusion criteria (negative screening), it would be
logical to expect their investment portfolio to be more constrained. Therefore, according to
the modern portfolio theory, this type of fund would be subject to greater total risk than the
rest. Moreover, the return of these funds may be lower since they cannot invest in certain
profitable sectors or industries (Boasson, Cheng, & Boasson, 2004; Tippet, 2001).
On the other hand, SRI funds that apply inclusion criteria (positive screening) would
invest theoretically in the best managed firms of each sector and so, in accordance with the
social theory of the firm, the financial performance of this type of fund would be higher
than that of the rest (Guerard, 1997; Tippet, 2001). Similarly, since the firms in which
these funds invest manage their economic, social and environmental risks better, the risk
of these funds might be expected to be lower than that of the rest of the funds, or at the
least, that the negative effects of non-diversification would be compensated. Nevertheless,
according to the classical theory of the firm, social and environmental policies adopted by
socially responsible firms raise their operational costs and, as a result, lower financial
performance of funds specialising in this type of firm is to be expected.
Following this line of reasoning, the analysis turns to whether the investment policy
applied by SRI funds is related to their financial performance so that the following null
hypothesis is to be tested:
H2: The type of screening applied by the fund manager is not related to the
performance of the fund.
This hypothesis has previously been analysed for the US fund market by Goldreyer
and Diltz (1999), Barnett and Salomon (2006) and Burlacu, Girerd-Potin, and Dupré
(2007). In the first two studies, there is evidence of a positive relationship between
investment policy and performance of SRI funds (specifically when the fund applies
positive screening), whereas in the study by Burlacu et al. (2007), the authors find a
negative relationship.
Moreover, SRI funds vary not only in their type of screening (negative and positive)
but also in the intensity of their social screening (Barnett, & Salomon, 2006). Then, this
null hypothesis will be tested:
H3: The intensity of the screening applied by the fund manager is not related to the
performance of the fund.
2. Data selection
The period of analysis selected for this study has been from January 1993 to December
2012 (a total of 240 monthly periods or 20 years). The whole period was divided into four
subperiods of 5 years, each one to investigate the differences in fund performance by time.
Nevertheless, many of the analyses realised are concentrated in the past 10 years because a
great number of SRI funds were set up after the year 2000.
To carry out the research, first, a list with all equity SRI funds operating in Europe was
drawn up using the database that the rating company Vigeo/Avanzi SRI Research maintains
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on European SRI funds. This database supplies information about different characteristics
of the European equity SRI funds such as the investment screening policy and includes all
funds that apply ethical, social and environmental screens to their investment decisions
and which also trade as suppliers of SRIs for the individual investor in general (retail
funds). This database, therefore, does not include those funds that simply donate part of
their commissions or profits to charity or other good causes (charitable funds), which were
considered to be conventional funds. The total number of equity SRI funds in the database
was 238 from 14 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom).
To compare the financial performance of SRI funds in the period analysed, all
conventional funds with the same domicile and investment objective than SRI funds
were taken from the Morningstar Direct’s database. This database supplied information
on domicile, investment objective, monthly net returns, inception date, size, fees and
turnover ratios of each fund. To avoid the survivorship bias, all funds operating during the
period of analysis were included in the sample, independent of the number of months in
operation. In addition, the most recent issues or categories (A, B, C and so on) of the same
fund were omitted from the analysis to avoid duplication in calculations as Statman (2000)
and Bello (2005) proposed in their studies.
3. Methodology
Monthly net returns were used to calculate funds’ performance (risk-adjusted returns),
specifically, Carhart’s alpha. Carhart’s measure estimates a four-factor model that includes
the market (MKT), size (SMB), value or book-to-market (HML) and momentum (MOM)
factors to control for the impact of investment styles on performance. Thus, the following
model has been estimated:
rit ¼ αi þ βMKTi rMKTt þ βSMBi rSMBt þ βHMLi rHMLt þ βMOMi rMOMt þ ηit (1)
where rit is the excess return of fund i in month t over the monthly return of a risk-free
deposit; rMKTt is the excess return of a market benchmark over the monthly return of a risk-











i are the factor loadings on the four factors and ηit stands for
the idiosyncratic risk. The term αi is the four-factor alpha and captures funds’ risk-adjusted
performance according to Carhart’s model. Monthly risk-free rate (US 1-month T-bill
rate), excess market return (MKT) as well as small minus large (SML), high minus low
(HML) and momentum (MOM) factors were collected from the Kenneth French’s data
library on his website (both Global and European market factors and returns were used in
the analysis). All funds’ returns are homogenised in US dollars because French’s data is
presented in this currency.
To investigate the impact of the social factor on the financial performance of SRI funds
relative to conventional funds (hypothesis H1), this research proposes to estimate the
following cross-sectional regression model, which controls the effects of some variables
recognised in other former studies such as funds’ age, size, management fee and turnover
ratio (Burlacu et al., 2007):
PERFi ¼ β0 þ β1AGEi þ β2SIZEi þ β3FEEi þ β4TURNi þ β5SOCi þ "i (2)
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where PERFi is the 5-year average of performance (measured by Carhart’s alpha) for
fund i; AGEi is funds’ age from its inception date until the last month quoted or December
2012 depending on whatever is first; SIZEi is the 5-year average funds’ total net assets
(TNA) in euros; FEEi is funds’ management fee; TURNi is funds’ turnover ratio; SOCi is a
dummy variable that equals 1 for SRI funds and 0 otherwise and εi is the residual term.
To evaluate whether the type of screening impacts on funds’ performance (hypothesis
H2), the following model is proposed to estimate:
PERFi ¼ β0 þ β1AGEi þ β2SIZEi þ β3FEEi þ β4TURNi þ β5NEGi þ β6POSi þ "i (3)
where NEGi (POSi) is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the fund i applies negative
(positive) screening and 0 otherwise, all other variables being as mentioned earlier.
Finally, a third regression model is proposed to contrast whether the total number of
screens that the fund imposes impacts on its financial performance (hypothesis H3):
PERFi ¼ β0 þ β1AGEi þ β2SIZEi þ β3FEEi þ β4TURNi þ β5INTi þ β6INT2i þ "i (4)
where INTi is funds’ screening intensity, measured as the number of screens used by
fund i. This model adds a squared screening intensity term to test whether between the
screening intensity and performance variables there is a linear or curvilinear relationship
(Barnett, & Salomon, 2006).
Each of former equations has been estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) as




Table 1 presents the summary statistics of fund characteristics for each fund category
(SRI and conventional) in periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012. According to the figures
in the table, the distribution of the variables AGE, SIZE, FEE and TURN in both groups
of funds and for the two periods is very similar. Variables AGE, SIZE and TURN
present positive asymmetric distributions whereas FEE, on the contrary, has a slightly
skewed distribution to the left. The non-parametric Mann–Whitney test has been used to
determine whether mean differences between each type of fund are statistically
significant.
Thereby, in the first period, SRI funds are, on average, younger and smaller than
conventional funds. Conventional funds are, on average, almost 2 years older and around
150 million of euros larger than SRI funds (marginal differences at the 10% level).
Besides, compared with the rest of funds, social funds have higher management fees
and lower turnover ratios being their management fees 16 basis points higher (the average
of management fees applied by SRI funds is 1.48% versus 1.32% of conventional funds)
and their turnover ratios almost 30 times lower (this means that SRI funds manage their
portfolios in a more passive way than conventional funds). On the other hand, in period
2008–2012, there is a very significant difference in age being SRI funds 1.35 years older
than conventional funds due to new funds created in this period what has decreased the
mean age of conventional funds in 3 years. Conventional funds continue being larger than
SRI funds but this difference is not statistically significant since the average size of
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conventional funds have decreased in almost 93 millions of euros. Finally, management
fees and turnover ratios have the same difference than in the former period, with the
differences significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
The mean values of performance (Carhart’s alpha) for each type of fund and period
analysed as well as the differences between the mean values of social and conventional
funds are presented in Table 2. The number of SRI funds to analyse in the period from 1993
to 2002 is smaller because in Europe the majority of these funds were created after the year
2000. The figures in Table 2 show that, for the whole period 1993–2012 (20 years), SRI
funds’monthly measures of performance were, on average, significantly worse than those of
conventional funds. For periods 1993–1997 and 1998–2002, the results obtained are not
clear because the significant differences in period 1993–1997 have different sign, positive
and negative, depending on the market benchmark used to measure the Carhart’s alpha or
these differences are not statistically significant as it happens in period 1998–2002.
Nevertheless, for periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, all differences are negative, indepen-
dently the market benchmark used to compare the funds’ performance and, in most cases,
very significant what can suggest that the non-existence of statistical significance in
previous studies might be motivated by the small number of SRI funds analysed.
Differences in mean performance measures (risk-adjusted returns) segmented by
country and investment objective for the last two 5-year subperiods 2003–2007 and
2008–2012 are presented in Table 3. By country, the results with Carhart’s alphas show
non-significant differences of performance between both types of funds except for funds
from France (a difference of −9.08 basis points in the 2003–2007 period with the global
benchmark or −6.58 and −5.11 basis points in the 2008–2012 period with both market
benchmarks) and the United Kingdom (−6.40 and −12.21 basis points in the first period or
−4.69 and −2.66 basis points in the following period with both market benchmarks).
Moreover, SRI funds from Luxembourg and Switzerland also present significant lower
performance alphas in the last period 2008–2012 (a difference of −13.42 and −12.29 basis
Table 2. Performance means by period (Carhart’s alpha).
Period Type of fund Global benchmark European benchmark
1993–1997 (1) Social (N = 43) 0.3738 −0.2672
(2) Conventional (N = 833) 0.1045 −0.0643
Difference† (1) – (2) 0.2693** −0.2029**
1998–2002 (1) Social (N = 143) −0.1422 0.2379
(2) Conventional (N = 2008) −0.0987 0.2418
Difference† (1) – (2) −0.0435 −0.0038
2003–2007 (1) Social (N = 183) −0.0505 −0.2716
(2) Conventional (N = 3113) −0.0175 –0.2375
Difference† (1) – (2) −0.0330*** −0.0340***
2008–2012 (1) Social (N = 181) −0.2950 −0.0833
(2) Conventional (N = 4250) −0.2481 −0.0566
Difference† (1) – (2) −0.0469** −0.0266*
1993–2012 (1) Social (N = 184) −0.1453 −0.1095
(2) Conventional (N = 4250) −0.1323 −0.0505
Difference† (1) – (2) −0.0130** −0.0590***
Notes: N = number of funds. Carhart’s alphas are expressed in monthly percentage.
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points depending on the benchmark employed in the fist case and a difference of −34.64
and −49.71 basis points in the second case). Similar results are obtained whether perfor-
mance differences are analysed by the investment objective. Thereby, the majority of
performance differences between social and conventional funds are not significant except
for those funds investing in European or British portfolios, which have negative and
significant differences, independent of the period analysed. Solely, funds investing in
energy and other Europe and sectors have a positive and significant difference in favour
of SRI funds (in this case, the positive difference is only obtained in one period whereas in
the other period the difference is negative).
Although most of these differences, positive or negative, are not statistically signifi-
cant, the majority of countries present negative differences of performance in favour of
conventional funds (9 or 8 countries in the first period depending on the market bench-
mark employed in the analysis and 10 or 9 countries in the following period). Looking at
the different rankings of performance in Table 3, it is possible to observe that the sample
sizes and the difference magnitudes are both related to get relevant levels of significance
because both factors are related to increase or reduce the power of the statistical tests
(Cohen, 1988). Thus, when the sample size of social funds is relatively large, a small
difference in the alpha value between both types of funds can be statistically significant,
whereas when the sample of social funds is smaller, a larger difference in alpha values is
necessary to obtain statistical significance between both types of funds. Consequently, a
reasonable explanation of the failure to find significant differences in performance
between SRI and conventional funds in previous studies may be in the small sample
sizes of social funds employed.
The results of this section, therefore, contradict the thesis of the social theory of the
firm, in which the application of social criteria in portfolio selection improves the SRI
funds’ performance, and support the opposing thesis of the classical theory of the firm as
well as the modern portfolio theory’s argument that restrictions on portfolio selection lead
to a lower financial performance.
4.2. Hypotheses testing: regression results
Table 4 presents main descriptive statistics and linear correlations among the variables
used in the regressions to test the hypotheses of this research for periods 2003–2007 and
2008–2012. The figures given in the table show a significant correlation among certain
variables (significance at the 10% level or less). Thus, financial performance is positively
correlated with size (r = 0.045 or 0.062 in the first period depending on the performance
measure used 1 or 2 and r = 0.062 in the second period and when the global market
benchmark is used), what is explained by scale effects, and negatively with management
fees (r = −0.049 in the 2003–2007 period and r = −0.237 or −0.188 in the following
period depending on the benchmark employed to calculate the Carhart’s alpha) and
turnover ratios (r = −0.064 or −0.054 in the second period depending on the measure of
performance) so that funds with higher management fees and more active strategies in
portfolio management present lower risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, size and manage-
ment fees are positively correlated with funds’ age (r = 0.177 and 0.032, respectively, in
the first period and 0.080 and 0.032 in the second period) so that funds with more years
operating in the market correspond to those with higher fees and larger assets.
The application of social screening on investment decisions, independently as it is
measured (by type of fund, type of screening or screening intensity), is positively
correlated with funds’ management fees (what means that SRI funds have, on average,
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higher management fees than the rest of the funds) and negatively with funds’ financial
performance (measured by Carhart’s alpha). This relationship between the application of
social screening and financial performance is stronger and more significant when the
global market benchmark is used and when the first period is analysed. In the case of
funds with positive screening, these are a little younger than the rest of funds (r = −0.033
or −0.030 depending on the period analysed). Furthermore, figures in Table 4 also suggest
that most funds using negative screens apply, at the same time, positive screening
independent of the period analysed (r = 0.778 and 0.775, respectively).
As for the screening strategy of SRI funds (see Table 5), the screening intensity
average of the 142 social funds with screening information in the sample is of 12.6
screens applying, on average, 6.9 negative and 5.7 positive screens. The distribution of
screening intensity among SRI funds is that half of these funds has a low screening
intensity (between 1 and 10 screens), 33.8% have a medium screening intensity (between
11 and 20 screens) and the rest of funds, 23 out of 142 (a 16.2%), have a high screening
intensity (21 or more screens). By country, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Norway are
the countries where SRI funds have, on average, more screening intensity (22.3, 19.4 and
19.0 screens, respectively), whereas France, Sweden and Spain are the countries where
social funds have the lowest screening intensity (6.5, 6.9 and 7.5 screens, respectively).
Although in the majority of countries social funds apply both negative and positive
screens, the case of France and Sweden is relevant because funds of these countries
apply a strategy of low screening based mainly on negative screens in the case of
Table 5. Screening strategy of SRI funds by country and investment objective.†

















Country Austria 5.5 7 6.3 8 11.8 6 3 1
Belgium 5.0 5 9.1 7 14.1 2 4 1
Denmark 5.0 1 10.0 1 15.0 0 1 0
France 1.3 8 5.3 22 6.5 20 3 0
Germany 7.8 4 6.3 4 14.0 1 3 0
Ireland 11.5 2 7.0 2 18.5 0 1 1
Italy 7.8 5 6.0 5 13.8 0 5 0
Luxembourg 7.0 21 7.4 22 14.4 10 11 4
Netherlands 8.8 6 7.0 6 15.8 3 1 2
Norway 9.0 1 10.0 1 19.0 0 1 0
Spain 4.0 2 3.5 2 7.5 2 0 0
Sweden 5.1 25 1.9 12 6.9 25 2 0
Switzerland 12.3 4 10.0 4 22.3 0 1 3
United
Kingdom
13.4 25 5.9 22 19.4 2 12 11
Objective Asia 3.0 1 10.0 1 13.0 0 1 0
Europe 3.5 21 6.0 34 9.4 26 12 0
Global 8.2 54 6.4 49 14.6 21 25 13
Energy 5.0 1 2.0 1 7.0 1 0 0
Health care 5.0 1 2.0 1 7.0 1 0 0
Other Europe 5.5 15 2.9 11 8.4 15 1 1
Other sectors 7.0 8 6.2 10 13.2 5 3 2
UK 13.2 14 5.7 11 18.9 1 6 7
US 5.0 1 0.0 0 5.0 1 0 0
All countries/objectives 6.9 116 5.7 118 12.6 71 48 23
Note: †Data at December 2007 supplied by Vigeo/Avanzi SRI Research.
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Sweden (25 funds with negative screens versus 12 funds with positive screens) or positive
screens in the case of France (22 funds with positive screens versus 8 funds with negative
screens). Taking into account the investment objective, European SRI equity funds
investing in British companies are the funds with the highest screening intensity (18.9
screens), whereas SRI funds investing in US companies or in the energy and health care
sectors have the lower screening intensity (5 and 7 screens, respectively). As it was
mentioned earlier, the majority of the European equity SRI funds apply both types of
screening (negative and positive) although SRI funds investing mainly in European
companies prefer to apply a positive screening strategy (34 funds with positive screens
versus 21 funds with negative screens).
The results of the regression analysis for period 2003–2007 are presented in Tables 6
and 7 depending on the market benchmark employed to measure Carhart’s alphas (the
Global or European market, respectively), whereas the results for period 2008–2012 are
presented in Tables 8 and 9. For period 2003–2007, regression results vary depending on
the market benchmark used in the analysis. With the Global market benchmark (see
Table 6), the results show that funds’ age is negatively related to financial performance,
whereas with the European benchmark (see Table 7), both variables are related positively.
Funds’ management fees and turnover ratios are related to risk-adjusted returns negatively
although only the first variable is statistically significant and for the second market
benchmark. On the other hand, funds’ size is positively related to financial performance
in any case. The results for period 2008–2012 are very similar, independent of the market
benchmark employed. Thus, in both cases (see Tables 8 and 9), funds’ size is positively
related to financial performance, whereas funds’ management fees and turnover ratios are
related to it negatively, which is in accordance with financial theory. The effects of size
and management fees on financial performance are very significant in any case (at the 1%
and 5% level), whereas the effect of turnover ratios is only significant when the FE of
country and investment objective are controlled. In the case of funds’ age the relationship
is only significant when its effect is positive and FE are not controlled.
As for the effect of the application in investment decisions of ethical, social and
environmental criteria (social screening) on funds’ financial performance, this study has
found a negative relationship between both variables. When the effect of the type of fund
(social or conventional) is analysed, the relationship between both variables is not
statistically significant for period 2003–2007 but significant for period 2008–2012 (except
when the FE of the investment objective are controlled). Therefore, according to the
empirical evidence, hypothesis H1 has to be rejected at least for the most recent period
2008–2012.
Whether the type of screening is taken into account, SRI funds applying negative and
positive screens show a negative difference in performance although this difference is not
statistically significant in many cases. Nevertheless, significant differences change from
one variable to other (negative or positive screening) depending on the market benchmark
applied, the period analysed or the model estimated. Consequently, there is no clear result
as to how is the relationship between the type of screening and funds’ performance
whereby hypothesis H2 cannot be rejected. The application of both types of screening at
the same time by the majority of European SRI funds could be the reason for this
inconclusive result.
When the screening intensity is analysed, it has been found that there is a negative
coefficient for screening intensity (measured by the number of social screens applied by
the fund manager) as well as a positive coefficient for its quadratic although these results
are only significant for the period 2003–2007 and for the Global benchmark. Hypothesis
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H3 has also been analysed by changing the variable to account for the screening intensity
and by introducing into the models three dummy variables: LOW_INT when the SRI fund
is between 1 and 10 screens, MEDIUM_INT when it is between 11 and 20 screens and
HIGH_INT when it is 21 or more screens. The results with these new variables reveal that,
for period 2003–2007, when SRI fund managers apply a medium screening intensity
(between 11 and 20 screens), the financial performance of these funds is worse than that of
conventional funds, whereas when they apply low or high screening intensity on their
portfolios, SRI funds have the same financial performance than conventional funds. This
result implies a curvilinear relationship between screening intensity and fund performance
as Barnett and Salomon (2006) found in their research of the US SRI funds. Thus, risk-
adjusted return declines at first as screening intensity increases, reaching a minimum, but
then increases continuously until it reaches the maximum social screening intensity of 34
screens. Nonetheless, this relationship is linear and inverse for period 2008–2012 so that
the more screening intensity, the lower performance of the fund, this result being obtained
both for market benchmarks and controlling for country and objective FE. According to
this result, hypothesis H3 has to be rejected.
5. Conclusions
This section summarises the main results of the empirical analysis about the differences in
financial performance between SRI and conventional equity funds using a large sample of
European social funds (184 funds) from 14 different countries. The period of time used to
analyse the monthly performance measures (Carhart’s alphas) of these funds was 20 years
from January 1993 to December 2012.
According to the results obtained in the descriptive analysis, differences in perfor-
mance (once the four risk factors market, size, style and momentum are controlled)
between SRI and conventional funds were negative and significant for the whole period
1993–2012. This result is also present in subperiods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012 although,
when the analysis is segmented by countries, many of them present no significant
differences in performance. Nevertheless, SRI funds from some countries such as
France and the United Kingdom performed significantly worse than conventional funds
in both subperiods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012. The short number of social funds in the
sample for each country could be the reason for this result since there is a relationship
among sample sizes, levels of significance and the magnitude of the difference. Thus, a
reasonable explanation of the failure to find significant differences in performance
between SRI and conventional funds in previous studies may be in the small sample
sizes of social funds used for each country.
The results obtained in the regression analysis show that the differences in perfor-
mance between SRI and conventional funds can be explained by differences in funds’ size
and management fees charged by fund managers. This fact has also been found in other
empirical studies referring to other periods and geographical areas (Bauer et al., 2003;
Bauer et al., 2005; Burlacu et al., 2007; Geczy, Stambaugh, & Levin, 2003).
Another interesting result of this research is that the type of screening used by the fund
is not relevant to explain differences in funds’ performance since both types of screening
(negative and positive) are used at the same time for the majority of European equity SRI
funds. Nevertheless, despite the negative effect of size and fees on SRI funds’ financial
performance, a worse performance of these funds can be also explained by the screening
intensity applied by social fund managers. Thus, it can be concluded that the application of
more screens on investment decisions really reduce funds’ performance although the
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functional relationship between both variables is not always the same (linear or curvi-
linear) depending on the period analysed.
Since investment restrictions are behind the underperformance of social funds, this
result provides evidence supporting the premises of the modern portfolio theory, while no
evidence has been found to support the thesis of the classical and social theories of the
firm that the type of equity in which social funds are investing (sustainable companies) is
affecting, positively or negatively, the funds’ financial performance. Therefore, social
screening has a cost for SRI funds’ investors.
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